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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 33
QUESTION OF PALESTINE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 5 June 1992 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that 5 June 1992 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. That occupation, maintained by increasingly repressive policies and practices, continues to this day in violation of international law and Security Council resolutions and in total disregard of international efforts to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict. Israel's intransigence and its obstinate refusal to recognize Palestinian national rights, in particular the right to self-determination, have so far presented an insurmountable obstacle to such efforts.

The Palestinian people have paid dearly for the occupation with loss of life, loss of land and natural resources, and severe restrictions on their political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights. The Israeli military operations of 1967 were accompanied by systematic and deliberate destruction of Palestinian villages and homes and the renewed dispersal of Palestinians. Almost half a million Palestinians were displaced and one third of them became refugees for the second time since 1948. The Israeli authorities have continued to deny Palestinians their fundamental right to return and to refuse to allow the reunification of families, and have rounded up and deported women and children considered to be living "illegally" with their immediate families in the occupied territory.

Shortly after the war, Israel annexed Jerusalem over the unanimous opposition of the international community, and began the confiscation of Palestinian land and the building of settlements in a process of gradual de facto annexation which continues at an ever accelerating pace. Over 60 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza has already been confiscated under various pretexts sanctioned by military orders. Some 230,000 Israeli citizens have been moved permanently to about 212 settlements throughout the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem and an increase of 25 per cent has taken place in the past year alone. Israeli Government leaders have repeatedly voiced their intention to remain in perpetual control of the occupied territory, which they have declared to be a part of "Greater Israel". Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated recently that in a few years, "hundreds of thousands of Jews will be living [in the occupied territory] ... and the notion of territorial compromise will fade away like a bad dream." (quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 4 May 1992). This policy of Israel is in clear violation of article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which the Security Council has declared to be applicable de jure to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

Through this illegal process of colonization, Palestinian towns, villages and agricultural areas are being increasingly encircled, their development restricted, and the unity of the Palestinian homeland is being shattered. Regional land-use and road plans have been devised and implemented to serve the Israeli settlements and to tie them more closely to Israel, bypassing Palestinian towns and villages.

Israel has also appropriated and controls Palestinian water resources and drastically restricts Palestinian use of water for farming and other needs. Discriminatory taxation and other administrative measures stifle the economic development of the occupied territory and make it more dependent on the economy of the occupying Power, Israel.

Moreover, a dual legal system has been established which extends the protection of Israeli civilian law to the Jewish settlers while imposing a separate harsh and discriminatory military law on the Palestinians. Every aspect of Palestinian life is controlled by the military authorities through some 2,000 military orders enacted during the twenty-five years of occupation. The Israeli authorities have also invoked emergency powers to restrict and deny civil and political liberties. Elected municipal councils were dissolved and mayors were expelled or detained and replaced by military governors; organizations have been banned and their officials arrested; trade unions harassed; the Arabic press censored. The Palestinian educational system has been subjected to systematic controls and direct interference in its contents and operation. Through the political screening and dismissal of teachers, censorship of textbooks, expulsion of students and other severe measures, the occupation authorities have sought to suppress any teaching of Palestinian history, culture and politics, and any expression of Palestinian nationalism. Moreover, Palestinian education has suffered due to consistent underfunding and lack of proper facilities.

Since the beginning of the intifadah in December 1987, the repression and oppression of the Palestinian civilian population has increased and continues. Human rights organizations have reported that from December 1987 through March 1992, at least 1,032 Palestinians were killed, most of them by shooting, and over 121,000 were injured by Israeli forces. They have also reported that open-fire regulations for Israeli soldiers have been increasingly relaxed and that undercover units of the army have engaged in killings of Palestinian activists. Studies of conditions in the prisons have documented ill-treatment and torture in Israeli prisons, and the death of at least 10 Palestinians during interrogation since 1987. During the same period, over 15,000 Palestinians were placed under administrative detention for periods of up to six months without charges or trial. Moreover, 66 Palestinians were expelled for "security reasons" (more than 1,300 since June 1967). Towns and villages in the occupied Palestinian territory experienced a combined total of over 11,000 days of curfew, the demolition or sealing of over 2,100 homes, and the uprooting of over 130,000 trees.

The additional damage to the fabric and well-being of Palestinian society resulting from arbitrary mass arrests, prolonged school closings, disruption of the health care system, raids by troops and attacks by armed settlers, denial of freedom of movement, loss of employment opportunities in Israel and the like, are too great to assess in this brief communication. The plight of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation has been further compounded by the repeated actions which the occupying forces have taken against the personnel of UNRWA engaged in the discharge of the mandate to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people under occupation.

Israel's determination to maintain the occupation has resulted in a consistent pattern of gross violations of the human rights of Palestinians in contravention of Israel's international obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, all of which Israel ratified in 1991. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People calls once again on all concerned, and in particular the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention and the supervisory bodies of the human rights treaties, to take all measures in their power to ensure that Israel abide by its obligations as stipulated in those instruments.

It is evident, however, that measures to provide protection to the Palestinians and to restore respect for human rights in and by themselves will not lead to a just and universally accepted solution of the question of Palestine unless they are accompanied by effective action by the international community as a whole, and the Security Council in particular, to ensure that Israel withdraw from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war, in conformity with Security Council resolution 242 (1967)

and the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

In its first report, submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly in 1976, the Committee recommended inter alia that the Security Council should establish a timetable for the complete withdrawal by Israeli occupation forces from those territories. The General Assembly has endorsed the Committee's recommendations every year since then and has repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally. The Assembly has also requested the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel, to consider the situation and adopt effective measures taking into account all the powers conferred upon it by the United Nations Charter.

On this twenty-fifth anniversary of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People wishes to draw once again the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly to the fact that their decisions remain unimplemented and to express its extreme concern at the ongoing efforts by Israel to turn the occupation into a permanent fact. Such a development would not only be a grave injustice to the Palestinian people and a denial of its fundamental rights, it would also continue to cause persistent tension and conflict in the region, and threaten the credibility of the United Nations at a time of historic importance for its efforts to create a better and more just and peaceful world for all. The international community has a duty and a responsibility to ensure that this unacceptable situation is brought to an end.

I would appreciate it if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 33 of the forty-sixth session, and of the Security Council.

Accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Kéba Birane CISSE
Chairman
Committee on the Exercise
of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People

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1 June 1992
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NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 MAY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ECUADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note verbale SCPC/1/92, dated 3 April 1992, has the honour to inform him that, immediately following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 748 (1992), the Government of Ecuador took the relevant administrative steps to ensure compliance throughout the country with the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of that resolution.

In particular, the Government of Ecuador has instructed all government offices and the private entities concerned to comply strictly with the sanctions imposed against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

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S/24047
1 June 1992
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LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our previous letters concerning violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft, I should like to inform you of a number of fresh violations.

20-21 May 1992

Twenty-six sorties, flown by 12 two-aircraft formations and two single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 4,000-6,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

21-22 May 1992

Twenty-three sorties, flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and three single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 3,000-6,000 metres, centred over Zakho, Dohuk and Ayn Zalah.

22-23 May 1992

Twenty-one sorties, flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 750-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred over Zakho, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Mosul, Irbil, west of Rawanduz and Amadiyah.

24-25 May 1992

Ten sorties, flown by five two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-6,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Zakho and Tall Afar.

26-27 May 1992

Twelve sorties, flown by four two-aircraft formations and four single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 3,000-6,500 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

27-28 May 1992

Ten sorties, flown by two two-aircraft formations and six single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 2,500-6,500 metres, centred over Zakho, Amadiyah, Mosul, Tall Afar, Dohuk and Irbil.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/24048
2 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 MAY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HONDURAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Honduras to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and wishes to refer to Security Council resolution 713 (1991) imposing the arms embargo on Yugoslavia and to the resolutions adopted by the Council concerning the situation in Yugoslavia.

In this connection and acting on instructions from the Government of Honduras, the Permanent Representative has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that, in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, Honduras has observed the provisions emanating from resolution 713 (1991) and from the resolutions adopted by the Security Council concerning the situation in Yugoslavia.

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30 May 1992

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 752 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 752 (1992), in which the Council demanded that all units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring; and requested the Secretary-General to consider without delay what international assistance could be provided in this connection.

I. BACKGROUND

2. On 26 April 1992, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina met at Skopje with General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of Staff of JNA and Acting Federal Secretary for Defence, and Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Federal Presidency in Belgrade, to define the role of JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its eventual withdrawal. This meeting did not produce a definitive agreement and the Belgrade authorities on 4 May announced their decision to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina by 18 May all JNA personnel who were not citizens of that Republic. On 13 May, Vice-President Kostic proposed to President Izetbegovic that the talks be resumed with the participation of representatives of the Bosnian Serb and Croat communities. On the same day, authorities of the so-called "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" announced their decision to form their own army, which would be composed of units of the former JNA based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as Commander of that army.

3. On 17 May, I received a letter from Admiral Milosav Simic, Chief of General Staff of JNA, requesting assistance in the safe withdrawal of JNA troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly from Sarajevo, Pazaric and Zenica. The letter referred, inter alia, to an agreement signed on 10 May 1992 at the premises of the United Nations Protection Force in

Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) at Sarajevo by representatives of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, JNA, the European Community Monitoring Mission and the personal envoy of Lord Carrington, Mr. Colm Doyle. On 21 May, Vice-President Kostic again wrote to ask me to request President Izetbegovic to order the deblocking of the JNA garrisons at Sarajevo. On 25 May 1992, I received a letter from President Izetbegovic in which, inter alia, he requested that UNPROFOR should supervise the withdrawal of part of the JNA personnel and weapons, in accordance with the agreement of 10 May 1992.

4. I have sought, through UNPROFOR, information about the present status of JNA units and personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the considerable restrictions on UNPROFOR freedom of movement in Sarajevo and elsewhere in the Republic, and the consequent lack of an independent information-gathering capacity, it has not been possible to obtain completely authenticated information, but the situation seems to be as described in the following two paragraphs.

5. The bulk of the JNA personnel who were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were citizens of that Republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of 4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of them appear to have joined the army of the so-called "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the Presidency of that Republic. Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there.

6. Those who are not citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are said by the Belgrade authorities to number barely 20 per cent of the total. Most of these are believed to have withdrawn already into Serbia or Montenegro, some of them having been subjected to attack during their withdrawal. Others however remain at various garrisons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in Serb-controlled areas, including two installations on the outskirts of Sarajevo. A further category consists of personnel who have been blockaded in their barracks by the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or hostile irregular forces. These are now mostly in the Sarajevo area, where the latest developments have been as follows:

(a) Some 600 to 1,000 soldiers are blocked in the Marshal Tito Barracks at Sarajevo, with nearly 200 vehicles. Negotiations on the evacuation of these barracks continued until 27 May 1992, when they broke down following a mortar attack which killed some 16 civilians in central Sarajevo. On 30 May 1992, the barracks came under attack from rocket-propelled grenades and flame-throwers fired by the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(b) Several hundred JNA personnel from Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks, a logistic base at Sarajevo, and Victor Bubanja Barracks were in the process of withdrawing from Sarajevo during the night of 27/28 May 1992. The convoy, which was being accompanied by UNPROFOR, was attacked by Serb irregulars opposed to the terms of their withdrawal and by units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and lost its way. Some elements became

separated from the rest; 30 JNA vehicles and their drivers went missing and at least 1 soldier was killed;

(c) Several hundred JNA cadets, mainly between 14 and 17 years of age, who were blockaded in Pazaric, some 15 kilometres south of Sarajevo, were evacuated on 29 May.

7. It will be apparent from the foregoing that the issue of the deblocking and safe withdrawal of the remaining JNA troops from their barracks at Bosnia and Herzegovina has become linked to other problems which have caused continuing conflict in that Republic and has in particular been complicated by problems relating to the withdrawal of heavy weapons from these barracks and from Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR has received indications that the JNA leadership in Belgrade is willing to leave the bulk of its weapons behind upon withdrawal, but the leadership of the army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is unwilling to permit this.

8. Uncertainty about who exercises political control over the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina has further complicated the situation. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency had initially been reluctant to engage in talks on these and other issues with the leadership of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and insisted upon direct talks with the Belgrade authorities instead. A senior JNA representative from Belgrade, General Nedeljko Boskovic, has conducted discussions with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, but it has become clear that his word is not binding on the commander of the army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", General Mladic. Indeed, as indicated in paragraph 6 (b) above, Serb irregulars attacked a JNA convoy withdrawing from a barracks at Sarajevo on 28 May under arrangements negotiated by General Boskovic. It also appears that the heavy shelling of Sarajevo on the night of 28/29 May took place on the orders of General Mladic in direct contravention of instructions issued by General Boskovic and the JNA leadership in Belgrade.

9. Given the doubts that now exist about the ability of the authorities in Belgrade to influence General Mladic, who has left JNA, efforts have been made by UNPROFOR to appeal to him directly as well as through the political leadership of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". As a result of these efforts General Mladic agreed on 30 May 1992 to stop the bombardment of Sarajevo. While it is my hope that the shelling of the city will not be resumed, it is also clear that the emergence of General Mladic and the forces under his command as independent actors apparently beyond the control of JNA greatly complicates the issues raised in paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 752 (1992). President Izetbegovic has recently indicated to senior UNPROFOR officers at Sarajevo his willingness to deal with General Mladic but not with the political leadership of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

10. As regards the withdrawal of elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, information currently available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of

Croatian Army personnel, in uniform, operating within, and as part of, military formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities have consistently taken the position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina have left the Croatian Army and are not subject to its authority. International observers do not, however, doubt that portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina are under the control of Croatian military units, whether belonging to the local Territorial Defence, to paramilitary groups or to the Croatian Army. It is unclear in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment, as required by the Council, can be achieved.

II. POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

11. Resolution 752 (1992) describes three possible alternatives for units of JNA and elements of the Croatian Army which are now in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They could either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring.

12. International assistance could play a role in implementing each of these alternatives. However, the provision of such assistance would presuppose that the necessary agreements had been concluded and that they would be respected by all parties, especially of course the commanders of the units and elements concerned. Such agreements would need to specify clearly exactly which military personnel were deemed to be "units of JNA" or "elements of the Croatian Army". This could present difficulties, given both the Croatian position mentioned above and, especially, the Belgrade authorities' position that their decision to withdraw JNA personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina does not relate to JNA personnel who are citizens of that Republic and over whom Belgrade no longer exercises constitutional authority. Those providing international assistance would also need to be given details, accepted by the principal parties, of the numbers, locations and armament of all troops to which the agreements applied.

13. The anomalous position of General Mladic and the forces under his command, who are subject neither to the authority of Belgrade nor to that of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will also need to be clarified in relation to any agreement. It is considered unrealistic to expect that the "Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" would be willing to place itself under the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreement would instead need to be sought on the disarming and disbandment of this "Army", though this is likely to be feasible only in the context of an overall political agreement on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14. Provided that the necessary agreements were in place, international assistance could take various forms. It could, for instance, consist of monitoring and verifying implementation of such agreements as have been achieved. International military personnel could also be deployed to help build confidence as the troops concerned were assembled and then moved out of

Bosnia and Herzegovina or to the locations where they would pass under the Government's authority or be disbanded. This sort of assistance has been provided by United Nations military observers in a number of recent peace-keeping operations. It has, however, to be repeated that recent experience has indicated that less respect is shown for such an international presence in former Yugoslavia than in other situations where international observers have recently played a role.

15. In the case of the third option, disbanding and disarming, international assistance could extend beyond monitoring and verification. It could include a role in ensuring the security of the arms laid down by the disbanded units or elements, e.g., through a double lock system, with one lock being controlled by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which would, of course, have to be agreed by all the parties) and the other by the international organization concerned. Although it is not specifically mentioned in resolution 752 (1992), another possibility would be for international troops to undertake the immobilization and/or destruction of some or all of the weapons of the disbanded units or elements.

III. OBSERVATIONS

16. The above is a brief survey of how international assistance could be provided to the various processes envisaged in paragraph 4 of resolution 752 (1992). It assumes that those processes would be agreed voluntarily by those in political and operational control of the troops concerned and that the latter would carry out the orders they received. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the solutions demanded by the Security Council could be achieved.

17. The Security Council's decision today to impose sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) creates a new situation. It is not yet clear what implications this will have for the issues discussed in this report. But it is to be hoped that this manifestation of the international community's determination to end the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina will make it easier to negotiate the necessary agreements.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1991 to 31 May 1992)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1991 to 31 May 1992 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 723 (1991) of 12 December 1991, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made (a report was submitted to the Council on 3 April 1992 1/) and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1992.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

> "In the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

This mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 750 (1992). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. 2/

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 31 May 1992:

Military personnel

Austria	HQ UNFICYP	12	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	388	
	Military police company	10	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	The Third Battalion, The Royal 22nd Regiment	538	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police company	11	575

Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 57	323	
	Military police company	13	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	2	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police company	3	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force scout car squadron, D squadron, 16th/5th Lancers	109	
	15th/19th The Kings Royal Hussars	339	
	UNFICYP support regiment	45	
	Engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	53	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	11	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police company	9	755
			2 103

Civilian police

Australia	20	
Sweden	18	38
Total UNFICYP		2 141

4. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. On 8 April 1992, Major-General Clive Milner (Canada) handed over command of the Force to Major-General Michael F. Minehane (Ireland).

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

5. UNFICYP maintained close liaison and cooperation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the north of the island, the guidelines established in 1983, 3/ and subsequently improved in practice, continued to be applied, with occasional difficulties experienced by UNFICYP. Efforts to increase UNFICYP's freedom of movement in the northern part of the island remained unsuccessful.

6. Once again, during the period under review, UNFICYP vehicles and personnel were stopped on a number of occasions by the military forces of both sides when approaching or entering the United Nations buffer zone. In addition, UNFICYP patrols continued to encounter interference when operating in areas of the buffer zone that are sensitive or not frequently patrolled. In some cases, UNFICYP's movement was restricted in these areas, and during the last six months there has been an increase in the number of incidents where weapons were pointed and cocked at UNFICYP personnel. UNFICYP continued to protest about these incidents to the authorities of both sides, reiterating its right to complete access to, and freedom of movement in, all parts of the buffer zone.

7. In addition, on a number of occasions UNFICYP was impeded by the Turkish Cypriot police element while conducting humanitarian tasks in support of Greek Cypriots in the north. Access to the Greek Cypriots living in the Karpas peninsula by UNFICYP humanitarian staff and civilian police was on several occasions denied and on three occasions UNFICYP staff were delayed and verbally abused by police officials. UNFICYP must rely on the steadfast cooperation of all parties and uninterrupted freedom of movement in carrying out its established and important humanitarian duties and responsibilities.

III. FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

8. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

9. UNFICYP keeps the United Nations buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 150 observation posts, 51 of which are permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols are also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

10. The UNFICYP patrol track runs the length of the United Nations Buffer Zone, and is essential to the ability of the force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise civilian activities in the buffer zone, re-supply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British Engineers maintain this track in useable condition.

11. In November 1991, 4/ the Secretary-General reported that UNFICYP had agreed to permit the National Guard to clear mines from an area of the buffer zone on the understanding that the land would be designated for farming; and that, despite strong protests from UNFICYP the National Guard had subsequently relaid the minefield. The Secretary-General also reported that the Government of Cyprus had agreed to remove the mines in question. Despite these assurances, the mines have not been removed from the buffer zone. I understand that the Government's commitment in this regard will be fulfilled in the near future.

12. The number of cease-fire violations remained low and both sides continued to demonstrate considerable restraint and discipline in this respect. There were only three incidents in which shots were thought to have been fired deliberately. The military forces on both sides cooperated with UNFICYP's investigations and tension remained at a low level.

13. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia continued to hold, with only a few minor violations by both sides. UNFICYP is continuing its efforts to extend the agreement to other areas in and adjacent to Nicosia, particularly where the troops of both sides remain in close proximity to each other. I strongly urge both sides to cooperate with these efforts.

14. During the period under review there was an increase in the number of air violations. There were 18 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish Forces aircraft and 14 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were 44 overflights from the north and 19 from the south by civilian aircraft. Civilian or military aircraft of other countries accounted for a further 10 overflights. All these violations create tension and increase the risk of serious incidents.

15. The National Guard programme of construction on its defensive positions increased all along its cease-fire line and remained a contentious issue, which at times caused an increase in tension. The Turkish Forces continued to call for the work to be stopped. UNFICYP expressed reservations about some of the construction and complained about the National Guard's failure to advise UNFICYP beforehand of upcoming work. The National Guard often refused to cooperate in UNFICYP's investigations and was reluctant to allow inspections of its positions. The National Guard maintained that the works in question were in the area under its control and in no way violated the status quo.

16. There were no significant incidents in the fenced area of Varosha. However, UNFICYP's freedom of movement within the area continued to be restricted by the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces. As has been reported to

the Security Council before, the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha. 5/ This position has been reiterated to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities on numerous occasions.

17. Six months ago, my predecessor reported 6/ that Greek Cypriot tourist and fishing boats violated the seaward extension of the cease-fire lines known as the maritime security line, established by UNFICYP as a practical measure for security and safety purposes 6/ in the vicinity of Kokkina and Famagusta. During the winter months, the number of violations decreased. However, in April and May 1992 the number of boats crossing the maritime security line has increased and on one occasion this led to warning shots being fired by Turkish forces at Greek Cypriot fishing boats. Such incidents raise tension and are potentially dangerous for the individuals concerned. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the responsible authorities will assist UNFICYP in supporting this practical and necessary measure. All concerned should warn fishermen, tourists and tourist companies of the danger involved and advise them of the location of the buffer zone and of its seaward extension.

18. Once again, unauthorized hunting by Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone caused UNFICYP safety and security concerns. Despite efforts undertaken by UNFICYP to implement practical arrangements with the Cyprus Government authorities to solve the problem, UNFICYP, with limited support from the Cyprus Police, was obliged to deal with some 119 individual violations and spent some 1,800 hours in policing this activity in a period of only 15 days. Safety and security concerns have prompted UNFICYP to foresee a ban on all future hunting in the buffer zone. All concerned will be expected to cooperate with the Force in this respect.

19. Each side again conveyed to me its concern about the strength of the military forces on the other side. For my own part, I remain very concerned about the strength and development of the military forces on both sides. This situation creates tension and carries the risk of serious incidents.

20. The Government of Cyprus complained again to the United Nations about the changing of place names and the distribution of land and title deeds to settlers and Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island. I have instructed UNFICYP to raise these matters with the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

21. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP continued to facilitate civilian humanitarian activities in areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. UNFICYP carries out these functions by shuttling between technical experts and other authorities on the two sides. This is a time-consuming process. It is desirable that the parties should set aside their reluctance and utilize UNFICYP's good offices to facilitate increased contacts between the two communities. I endorse UNFICYP's efforts

to sponsor bicommunal meetings and sincerely urge the authorities in both communities to support these efforts.

22. During this past winter, Cyprus had higher than average rainfall. As a result, reserves of water, both in-ground and in reservoirs, have seen a marked improvement. None the less, close and direct cooperation between the parties is required in order to ensure that the development, use and distribution of water resources on the island are judicious and fair. Of the many related issues, the careful and necessary management of the Morphou aquifer should receive immediate bicommunal attention.

23. The number of Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island is now 551, of whom 548 live in the Karpas peninsula and the remaining 3 in Kyrenia. UNFICYP continued to discharge humanitarian functions for these Greek Cypriots, delivering to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Government of Cyprus and the Cyprus Red Cross. Beginning in December 1991, the Turkish Cypriot authorities introduced a new policy whereby all such supplies that they considered not to be of a traditional humanitarian nature or which were not specifically approved by them would be subject to a customs levy. I urge the Turkish Cypriot authorities to adopt policies that facilitate unrestricted living conditions and standards for Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island.

24. UNFICYP recently took an initiative that is aimed at returning to the relevant Red Cross representatives responsibility for the delivery of mail, medical supplies and Red Cross messages across cease-fire lines. I request full support for this initiative.

25. UNFICYP interviewed those Greek Cypriots who applied for "permanent transfer" to the southern part of the island in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Three such permanent transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 298 visits by Greek Cypriots from the Karpas area to the southern part of the island. Despite strong efforts, UNFICYP has been unable to persuade the Turkish Cypriot authorities to loosen the present tight restrictions on the frequency and duration of temporary transfers to the south of Greek Cypriots living in the north.

26. UNFICYP continued its periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and assisted in arranging family reunion visits for Turkish Cypriots at the Ledra Palace hotel. It was apparent that the Turkish Cypriot authorities gave preference to applications originating in the north. During the reporting period, of 58 applications processed from Turkish Cypriots living in the south, only 14 were approved. This matter was raised with senior officials in the north. Despite assurances received, there were no appreciable improvements in the practice. UNFICYP continued to distribute welfare/pension cheques to Turkish Cypriots living in the north who are former employees of the Government of Cyprus.

27. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island has continued to decline and is now 250. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging contact between Maronites living on the island and to deliver to them foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government.

28. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation of civilian members of both communities resident in the north. When the need arose, UNFICYP escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the south and regularly delivered medicines to members of the Turkish Cypriot community. Difficulties have arisen recently in both sides' approach to the transport of Turkish Cypriot patients to the south. I urge both sides to protect such vital humanitarian activities from political interference.

29. UNFICYP continued to facilitate relations between the communities in the mixed village of Pyla, located in the buffer zone. UNFICYP has actively assisted village mukhtars in exercising the full range of their responsibilities and has, on a strictly humanitarian basis, facilitated practical solutions to controversial issues. It has urged both sides to avoid any political manifestations or other activities that might jeopardize the generally good relations existing between the two communities in Pyla.

30. In March 1992, the Turkish Cypriot mukhtar requested UNFICYP's assistance in improving access to Turkish language radio/TV broadcasts through an increase in the height of an existing antenna and the replacement of equipment located at the Turkish Forces' post above Pyla. UNFICYP investigated all aspects of this proposal and, after receiving assurances from the mukhtar and from the Turkish Forces that the replacement equipment and the project as a whole would be used solely for stated civilian purposes, UNFICYP raised no objections to the modifications proposed. Accordingly the equipment was installed and will, by agreement, remain under UNFICYP surveillance.

31. The Cyprus police control point on the Larnaca-Pyla road, south of the buffer zone, continues to block the flow of tourists to the village of Pyla and has severely disrupted its economy. On a number of occasions, UNFICYP has requested that this obstacle be removed.

32. UNFICYP has continued to pursue exhaustive discussions with the parties in order to facilitate telephone communications between Turkish Cypriot residents of Pyla and the north.

33. In cooperation with UNFICYP and other United Nations agencies, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as coordinator of humanitarian assistance to Cyprus, continues to promote bicommunal projects aimed at giving Greek and Turkish Cypriots opportunities to work out a unified approach to areas of concern that affect the whole country. Bicommunal activities include seminars, workshops, research, training, consultation meetings, exchange visits, and sharing of expertise and equipment.

34. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as coordinator of the United Nations system's operational activities for development, continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued bicommunal projects with the various United Nations technical agencies active in Cyprus including the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nation (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

35. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions (fifty-seventh to sixty-first), consisting of 18 meetings, of which 12 were attended by the three members of the Committee and their assistants and 6 were attended solely by the three members.

36. The third member continued his efforts to obtain agreement from both sides that the totality of the cases of missing persons be submitted to the Committee. In doing so, the parties will help the Committee to assess with precision the problem of missing persons in Cyprus as a whole.

37. On 10 April 1992, the Committee issued a communiqué explaining some of the difficulties it faces, and the nature of the problems currently under discussion. In particular, the Committee made a public appeal to official bodies and to private persons to furnish the Committee with any information in their possession on missing persons, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Such information would be treated in the strictest confidence by the Committee. It also recalled that, according to the arrangements in force, no prosecution of any nature will ensue as a result of statements or information given to the Committee.

38. In December 1990, my predecessor wrote to President Vassiliou and to H.E. Mr. Denktaş pointing out that, even though it had been in existence for many years, the Committee had been given details on only about 15 per cent of the cases and urged both sides to submit to the Committee all its cases. Unfortunately, neither side has acceded thus far to the Secretary-General's request. In the same letter, the Secretary-General signalled that it would be important for the members of the Committee, in connection with the question of how to deal with the results of its investigations, to reach a consensus on criteria that both sides would be ready to apply in their respective investigations. He added that it would also be useful for the Committee to consider modalities for sharing with affected families any meaningful information that is available to the Committee on the cases of concern to them. It is regrettable that the intervening period has seen no progress on these issues.

39. I am persuaded that continued lack of progress on the above-mentioned issues would have the effect of indefinitely impairing the work of the Committee. Such a situation, were it to continue, would necessarily require a fundamental review of the Committee and its work.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 June 1992, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at $15.4 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 722
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	742
Rations	965
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	3 231
Death and disability	100
Miscellaneous and contingencies	250
Total I	7 300
II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
Pay, allowances and transport	7 400
Contingent-owned equipment	700
Total II	8 100
Grand total (I and II)	15 400

41. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb.

42. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force which is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only $4.4 million has been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditures of some $15.4 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to June 1981. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be approximately $192.7 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period.

VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

43. In my report of 3 April 1992, 1/ I reported to the Security Council on my mission of good offices. On 10 April the Council adopted resolution 750 (1992). I have been requested to submit a full report to the Council on the outcome of my efforts by July 1992.

VII. FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

44. As indicated in paragraphs 30 to 33 of my report of 3 April 1992, 1/ the Security Council may soon have to decide on how to respond to the withdrawal or reduction of one or more of UNFICYP's main contingents, a move which would deny the Force the troops that have been judged necessary for it to execute its existing mandate. This problem arises in large part because UNFICYP is subjected to a uniquely unsatisfactory system of financing that distorts the normal criteria for judging whether a peace-keeping operation is required and, if so, with what mandate and how many personnel.

45. The future of UNFICYP may also, of course, be affected by the outcome of my present intensive efforts to complete the set of ideas referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 750 (1992), on which I shall report to the Council by July 1992.

46. In November 1990, my predecessor appointed a team to review the organization and operations of UNFICYP. The review team's findings included the following:

(a) The functions of UNFICYP (maintenance of the status quo and prevention of a recurrence of fighting, and the promotion of a return to normal conditions) remain valid and necessary;

(b) Because of the absence of agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides, the maintenance of the status quo and the prevention of a recurrence of fighting are not self-sustaining. The visible presence of the Force and its deployment all along the buffer zone remain necessary to enable UNFICYP to be present where and when required;

(c) While the functions and tasks of UNFICYP and the conditions under which it has to operate are the same as in 1980, the number of permanently manned observation posts has been significantly reduced and has reached the minimum acceptable level. The number of on-line troops necessary to man the permanent and temporary observation posts, checkpoints, patrols, etc. could not be reduced any further without impairing the Force's ability to carry out the necessary functions arising from its mandate.

Notwithstanding the third of the above findings, the team examined whether UNFICYP could be replaced by a peace-keeping operation modelled on either the former United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) or the

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights in the Syrian Arab Republic. 4/ The team came to the conclusion that neither of those options was viable from the operational point of view in the conditions obtaining in Cyprus.

47. In any case, an operation based wholly or partly on military observers would cost the United Nations more than the existing infantry-based force. This is because the cost of paying mission subsistence allowance to the military observers (the standard financial arrangement for such personnel) would exceed the cost to the United Nations of the infantry personnel whom the observers would replace. (The estimated annual cost to the United Nations of military observers deployed to Cyprus under existing financial arrangements would be over $30,000 each.) Moreover, mission subsistence allowance would obviously have to be paid on time, whereas the United Nations is at present 10 years late in reimbursing troop costs to the contributing Governments. In addition to its operational inadequacies, the military observer option would thus not be viable financially unless it is assumed that the Security Council would accept an increase in the cost of the Force and a move to financing by assessed contributions.

48. My predecessor proposed an alternative solution namely to reduce UNFICYP from the four existing battalions to three slightly larger battalions. With the cooperation of the troop-contributing Governments, this would have produced savings of 30 per cent without cutting the number of troops on the line. This option would, however, have required a change to assessed funding, which did not enjoy the necessary support in the Council. I still think that it is the best option available.

49. Now that the question has been brought to a head, for entirely understandable reasons, by some of the troop-contributing Governments, there are broadly two ways in which the Council could proceed. One would be to retain the existing mandate and accept the risks of trying to execute it with fewer troops. The second would be to tailor the mandate to one that could be executed by the number of troops deemed likely to be available under the present financial arrangements. In either case, the Security Council would need to assure itself that there was a reasonable prospect of stability for the next few years, in order to avoid either gradual attrition of the Force or repeated changes in its mandate as a result of decisions by the troop-contributing Governments. Detailed consultations with the latter would thus be necessary before recommendations were submitted to the Security Council.

50. Either option would involve risks, but the second would be the riskier. This is because it would involve abandoning the function which has enabled UNFICYP to keep the peace in Cyprus since 1974, namely control of the buffer zone. This is not a barren no man's land. It has a sizeable resident population and is the scene of agricultural and industrial activity of some importance. Without the presence of United Nations troops to supervise those activities and to ensure that there are no moves forward by the troops of either side, the danger of petty incidents escalating into armed conflict

would greatly increase. If it is assumed that for these reasons the Security Council would wish to maintain UNFICYP's existing mandate, the question to be examined is how that mandate could be executed with fewer troops.

51. In such circumstances, it would be essential that there should be the least possible reduction in the number of troops on the line. Contributing Governments that wished to maintain their participation with a reduced strength should be urged most strongly not to touch their line companies and to concentrate any cuts on their headquarters and support elements.

52. However, a better solution would be to change UNFICYP's structure, in order to improve the ratio of line to headquarters/support troops. For this reason, I share my predecessor's preference for a three-battalion structure. At present the four battalions (or equivalent units) deployed on the line in Cyprus have an average strength of less than 400 each. This is starkly less efficient than the large battalions that the United Nations has deployed in more recent peace-keeping operations (750-strong in Namibia, 850-strong in Cambodia, 900-strong in Croatia). The worst option, from the United Nations point of view, would thus be for all four Governments to reduce the size of their existing battalions further.

53. The least bad option, again from the United Nations point of view, would be for one of the existing contingents to withdraw completely with the others increasing their line strength or, if that is not possible, cutting some of their headquarters/support troops. The previous Force Commander, in his farewell visit to New York, told me that he believed that there was room for such savings, which could be used to maintain the present number of troops on the line, within a smaller Force.

54. Another possibility for improving the ratio of line troops would be for two or more contributing Governments to form a single, large, composite battalion with a mixed headquarters. This is a notoriously difficult concept, and preliminary soundings of the UNFICYP troop-contributing Governments have shown little enthusiasm for it. A less radical approach would be to find ways of sharing some administrative and logistics support functions among battalions in a way that would reduce overall the number of troops assigned to such functions.

55. If a reduction in UNFICYP's strength on the line becomes inevitable, the Force will need a rapid reinforcement capability to deal with any situation, which it is unable, with its reduced strength, to bring under control. The only practicable provider of such a capability would be the United Kingdom, using troops it has deployed for national purposes in the sovereign base areas in Cyprus.

56. The above discussion of possible options reflects United Nations priorities and preferences. These will not necessarily coincide with those of the troop-contributing Governments, which will be guided by their own political and military priorities. Consultations are, therefore, necessary in order to clarify with the troop-contributors their precise intentions about

continuing participation in UNFICYP, including the timing of any reduction or withdrawal of their contingents, and to explore with them the possibilities discussed in the present report. In this way it will be possible to define specific proposals for submission to the Security Council at the appropriate time.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

57. During the past six months UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions in an exemplary manner, sometimes under difficult circumstances.

58. I believe that the two communities could make better use of UNFICYP's ability to promote and facilitate greater contact between them. This useful function flows from the Force's mandate to promote a return to normal conditions on the island. It will continue to receive increased emphasis.

59. On my instructions, the authorities on both sides in Cyprus have been made aware of my concerns about the situation in Pyla and my view that the bicommunal nature of the village demands special cooperation and understanding by both sides. It is of fundamental importance that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot village mukhtars be allowed to work together without outside interference so that they can exercise the full range of their responsibilities in village affairs. I therefore appeal to both sides to refrain from interfering in local activities in Pyla. UNFICYP will continue to fulfil its mandate to restore normal conditions by providing all possible assistance to effective cooperation between the two mukhtars. It will also continue to exercise actively its responsibility for resolving contested issues in the village by facilitating practical solutions based on strictly humanitarian criteria.

60. In the prevailing circumstances, I believe that the continued presence of the Force on the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period, that is until 15 December 1992, subject to possible changes in its size and mandate for which I might need to seek the Council's approval in the light of the consultations envisaged in paragraph 56 above. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned and I will report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

61. In making this recommendation, I must again stress that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes a most unfair burden on the troop-contributing countries. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. In his report of 15 October 1991 on the financing of UNFICYP, my predecessor formally reiterated his belief that the best way to finance UNFICYP on a more equitable basis would be for the United Nations share of the costs of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 682 (1990) of

21 December 1990, the Secretariat cooperated actively with the Security Council in its deliberations on this issue and identified a new method of defining and rationalizing extra and extraordinary costs. Should the Council decide to move the Force to assessed contributions, the Governments concerned had agreed to reduce their claims by some 29 per cent. It is still my hope that the Council will decide to place UNFICYP on a sound and secure financial footing.

62. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support that they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to thank the Governments that have made voluntary contributions towards the financing of the Force.

63. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilion, to the Force Commander, Major-General Michael Minehane and his predecessor Major-General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP, who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ S/23780.

2/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1980, document S/14275 and footnote 57.

3/ See ibid., Thirty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1983, document S/15812, para. 14.

4/ S/23263.

5/ S/18880, para. 28.

6/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1985, document S/17657, para. 19.

7/ S/21982, paras. 54-59.

8/ S/23144.


قبرص • 塞浦路斯 • CYPRUS • CHYPRE • КИПР • CHIPRE
حدود مقاطعة
区界
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округов
Limite de distrito
مطار ، مهبط
机场，简易机场
Airfield, airstrip
Aéroport, terrain d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлётно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
HQ UNFICYP
HQ UNCIVPOL
HQ BRITCON
HQ CANCON
Force Scout Car Sqn (-)
UN HP Coy (-)
UNFICYP Support Regt
Engineer Det
Signal Sqn
Army Air Corps Flight
Transport Sqn
Ordnance Det
Reme Workshop
Medical Centre
Canadian Logistic Coy
HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
HQ Coy (-)
One Coy
One Engr Tp
HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
HQ & SP Coy
One Engr Sect
One Coy
Two Recce Sects
One Ferret Tp
MP Det
One Coy
SECTOR 2
One Pl
One Coy (-)
SECTOR 1
UNCIVPOL Stn
SECTOR 3
One Coy
HQ SECTOR 4 (AUSCON)
HQ Coy
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
One Pl
Ferret Tp
Coy (-)
One Pl
SECTOR 4
MP Det
UNCIVPOL Stn
One Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MP Det
Liaison Post
One Pl
One Coy (-)
Ferret Tp
HQ SECTOR 3 (CANCON)
HQ Coy
One Coy
Recce Pl
UNCIVPOL Stn
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
KYRENIA
NICOSIA
FAMAGUSTA
LARNACA
LIMASSOL
PAPHOS
وزع قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص في أيار/مايو ١٩٩٢
一九九二年五月联塞部队的部署
UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF MAY 1992
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE MAI 1992
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА МАЙ 1992
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN MAYO DE 1992
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للقوات التركية
土耳其部队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
خطوط وقف اطلاق النار للحرس الوطني القبرصي
塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线
Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote
Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre
حدود عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة لصيانة السلم في قبرص
联塞部队行动分界线
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
MAP NO. 2930 REV. 30 UNITED NATIONS
MAY 1992

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24050/Add.1
10 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 December 1991-31 May 1992

Addendum

In my report of 31 May 1992 (S/24050, para. 60), I recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on the matter. I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have indicated their concurrence with the proposed extension. The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with and supports the position of the Turkish Cypriot side, as expressed in previous meetings of the Security Council on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24051
29 May 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 28 MAY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SRI LANKA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to the latter's note dated 3 April 1992, regarding the imposition of sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in accordance with Security Council resolution 748 (1992), has the honour to inform him that the Government of Sri Lanka has instructed the relevant ministries, government departments and institutions to take appropriate measures to comply with the resolution.

The Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka has the further honour to inform the Secretary-General that Sri Lanka would revert to the Security Council in terms of paragraph 9 (f) of resolution 748 (1992), in the event of special problems that might arise from the implementation of measures specified in the resolution.

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UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/237
S/24052
2 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 1 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of June 1992, I have the honour to transmit herewith the communiqué of the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States issued on 24 May 1992 concerning the Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon.

I request you to circulate this letter and the annexed communiqué as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad ABDUL GHAFFAR
Permanent Representative
of the State of Bahrain to
the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

* A/47/50.

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Annex

The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States condemns the Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon

The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States is following with extreme concern and the strongest disapproval the Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon, which is now entering on its fifth successive day, since the Israeli occupation forces are continuing to bombard the villages and regions of southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa, causing the deaths of a large number of innocent victims. This aggression comes at a time when Arab and international efforts are being redoubled with a view to the achievement of a lasting, just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region.

Israel's continuation of its criminal aggression against an Arab country is basically aimed at impeding the implementation of the resolutions of international legitimacy, in particular Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which calls for Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and for assistance to the Lebanese Government in imposing its sovereignty over all its territory. It is also aggression aimed against Lebanese national efforts to achieve reconciliation among all factions of the Lebanese people.

The international community, in particular the States members of the Security Council, are called upon to take the necessary steps to put an immediate end to this criminal aggression and to force Israel to implement the resolutions of international legitimacy, first and foremost Security Council resolution 425 (1978). The Security Council bears full responsibility for halting this aggression and affirming the necessity of compliance with its resolutions.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24053
2 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

During meetings with the President of the Security Council in May, the Secretary-General and a number of States members of the Council, I drew attention to the fact that the escalation of the military action by the Republic of Armenia on the territory of Azerbaijan threatens the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of our Republic. Your predecessor has shown understanding for our deep anxiety by sending the United Nations fact-finding mission headed by Mr. F. Vendrell. The Mission was received by Mr. Isa Gambarov, Chairman of the Azerbaijani Parliament, who stated that if the international community would not recognize the fact of Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, the tragedy would continue further.

I wish to add that the Republic of Armenia pursues its political goals not only by the use of force, but that its armed forces have also resorted to using chemical weapons. The effects of iprit, cyanide and phosgen were detected during blood tests of wounded Azeris in the recent Nakhichevan events.

I have the honour to draw your attention to the enclosed statements of several Member States and the number of international organizations.

I would like to underline their principled position with great satisfaction.

Margaret Tutwiler, the United States State Department spokeswoman, announced during the briefing on 21 May 1992 that the United States "will not accept unilateral changes in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, or any other territory [by] military actions or violence" (The New York Times, 22 May 1992).

The important statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation says that "No current circumstances can permit the State to resort to the annexation of foreign territory. No one can count on the support of Russia for such unlawful actions" (Izvestiya, 23 May 1992).

In this connection, the North Atlantic Council stated on 22 May 1992 that "any action against Azerbaijan's or any other State's territorial integrity or to achieve political goals by force would represent a flagrant and unacceptable violation of the principles of international law and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]". It should be mentioned that the Council calls for taking "immediate steps to de-escalate the conflict, including withdrawal from occupied areas".

Furthermore, an important announcement on this question was made by the European Community on 22 May 1992, which says that "the Community and its member States condemn in particular ... any actions against territorial integrity or designed to achieve political goals by force, including the driving out of civilian population".

As Your Excellency is aware, the Committee of Senior Officials of CSCE at its last meeting prepared a document on the current situation in the region. The document says that participating countries "state in the strongest terms their demand for respect of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and call for immediate cessation of hostilities". The adoption of this document was blocked by the negative position of Armenia.

As will be seen from the foregoing, several members of the international community and a number of international organizations are deeply concerned with the complicated situation in the region and the Armenian actions are regarded as violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign State - the Azerbaijani Republic - and, that in accordance with the well-known resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, must be qualified as aggression.

At a time when the world community is trying to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the preparations for the Rome Conference of CSCE on this problem are taking place, the Armenian forces attacked on 31 May 1992 the town of Chaikend close to the city of Gianja, threatening its population of 500,000 inhabitants.

I would appreciate it if you could kindly have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Article in The New York Times, 22 May 1992, p. A29

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Leslie H. Gelb

War in Nakhichevan

As Armenian irregulars bear down on Nakhichevan (an Azerbaijani enclave in Armenia) and gain control of Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan), and as Turkey debates intervening to protect its Turkic and Muslim brethren, Bush Administration policy dances on the point of a needle.

United States political imperatives - influential Armenians, mainly in the pivotal state of California - strongly favor Armenia. Policy considerations - plans to develop Ankara as a strategic counterweight to Iran and Russia in Central Asia - all tug toward Turkey.

An enclave, Armenia, Turkey and the United States

Margaret Tutwiler, the State Department spokeswoman, danced to these two tunes earlier this week. She began by announcing that the United States "will not accept unilateral changes in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, or any other territory [by] military actions or violence". Then came these exchanges:

Q: The status is that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. The Azeris are presumably not trying to change that status. Is it right by the process of elimination to assume it must be the Armenians?

Tutwiler: There are ... a number of views of this situation ... our point today ... is [the escalating violence].

Q: So the situation is that the United States simply will not take a position on who is the aggressor and who is the victim ...?

Tutwiler: Right ...

Q: What does it mean that the United States "is not going to accept unilateral changes ..."?

Tutwiler: We use this phrase in any number of instances ... It is a standard phrase that we use here. I can't explain to you why they do; it's been used for years ...

Q: It also normally precedes some strong action by the United States ... You used the statement "will not accept" just before we went into Panama with military force as well. Are we prepared to take some further strong action in this situation?

Tutwiler: Not to my knowledge.

Behind the scenes, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have been working the telephones to Yerevan. They are telling Armenian leaders to stop the fighting in Nagorno and accept mediation by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to hold back their irregulars in Nakhichevan. And they are pleading with Ankara not to intervene.

While United States diplomacy has been evenhanded, Administration feelings are increasingly anti-Armenian. Officials do not accept Yerevan's assertion that it has no control of Armenian irregulars in Nagorno and Nakhichevan. They believe, as one key official put it, that the Armenians, long the victims in this region, are "trying to create military facts on the ground while our hands are tied by our elections - just the way the Serbs are doing it in Bosnia".

The comparison is nasty, and Armenian-Americans are well aware of the increasing Administration tilt toward Turkey. "But they can't do anything about it this year," said Van Krikorian of the Armenian Assembly in Washington, referring to White House worries about Armenian support in the Presidential campaign.

Then Mr. Krikorian put down the policy card United States officials fear most. If Washington abandons Armenia diplomatically or stands by while Turks kill Armenians once again, he said, "Armenia would have to look to Iran for security."

To Administration officials, Iranian fundamentalism represents the immediate threat to Western interests in Central Asia. They hope to build up Turkey, a Muslim but secular nation, as the alternative. And they do not want Armenian military successes against Turkic peoples to put Ankara in a position where it must either stand aside and look impotent or intervene with force.

Turkish intervention would compel the United States to back Armenia for politics' sake and undercut Ankara. It might also trigger what officials see as the long-term threat to Central Asia - a resurgent Russia. Already this week, a senior Russian general warned hyperbolically that outside intervention would "obviously place us on the verge of a third world war ...".

Telling these ancient enemies not to kill each other will not take the United States and the West far. At some point they will have to hold Armenia in check. And the only way to do that is by guaranteeing long-victimized Armenians their security at home and their rights in Azerbaijan. Otherwise history will return with a vengeance.

Annex II

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 22 May 1992

Moscow, 22 May. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation expresses its deep regret and grave concern about the latest events regarding the town of Lachin (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Nakhichevan, which have again resulted in loss of human life and escalation of hostilities and have provoked additional tension in the whole region.

No current circumstances can permit the State to resort to the annexation of foreign territory. No one can count on the support of Russia for such unlawful actions. That is why it is impossible to consent to the seizure of the town of Lachin and, if it has really happened, to the attacks of militant groups on the Nakhichevan areas bordering Armenia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation strongly urges all the parties involved in the confrontation to the cease-fire to begin talks, to use the unrealized potential of various peacemaking missions which promote political settlement of the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation expresses its readiness to mediate in stopping the bloodshed and in searching for a political solution to the crisis.

Annex III

Statement made on 22 May 1992 by the North Atlantic Council on the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh

Allies are profoundly disturbed by the continuing bloody conflict and loss of life in the context of the crisis centred on Nagorno-Karabakh. The recent grave intensification and extension of the violence beyond Nagorno-Karabakh, including Nakhichevan, which threatens to escalate the conflict substantially, concerns all of us and endangers the efforts by the international community, led by CSCE, to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Allies condemn the continuing use of force and call on all parties involved to establish immediately an effective cease-fire. They further call on them to take additional immediate steps to de-escalate the conflict, including withdrawal from occupied areas, and to cooperate with international efforts to achieve a negotiated solution and end the tragic suffering of the peoples of the area. Allies appeal to all parties to facilitate the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to victims of this tragic conflict.

There can be no solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh or to the differences it has caused between Armenia and Azerbaijan by force. Any action against Azerbaijan's or any other State's territorial integrity or to achieve political goals by force would represent a flagrant and unacceptable violation of the principles of international law and CSCE. In particular, we could not accept that the recognized status of Nagorno-Karabakh or Nakhichevan can be changed unilaterally or by force. All people in the region affected by the crisis are entitled to the protection afforded by CSCE principles and commitments. We also deplore the expulsion of people from their homes. A lasting solution to the conflict can only be achieved through negotiations in good faith based on respect for international norms and obligations. Especially those embodied in the Helskinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents.

In particular, allies call urgently on all parties concerned to prepare constructively and without further hostilities for the CSCE Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh to begin as soon as possible. This Conference must resolve the conflict and the bloodshed. Allies strongly urge all States concerned to seize this opportunity to achieve a permanent, peaceful settlement.

Annex IV

Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh issued by the European Community and its member States on 22 May 1992

The Community and its member States express their deepest concern at the latest escalation of the fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and strongly condemn the use of force by whatever side. The Community and its member States deplore the renewed suffering inflicted on populations and the loss of human life resulting from the continuing fighting.

All inhabitants of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the Armenian and Azeri populations of Nagorno-Karabakh are entitled to the same levels of protection afforded by their Government's acceptance of the principles and commitments of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Therefore, the Community and its member States condemn in particular as contrary to these principles and commitments any actions against territorial integrity or designed to achieve political goals by force, including the driving out of civilian populations. The fundamental rights of Armenian and Azeri populations should be fully restored, in the context of existing borders.

The Community and its member States appeal to Armenia and Azerbaijan to show maximum restraint and to contribute constructively to the CSCE process. In this context they also urge all parties to work towards the early convening of the CSCE peace conference on Nagorno-Karabakh and to find a solution regarding the modalities of a representation of the communities of Nagorno-Karabakh, without which no lasting peace can be established.

Annex V

Document prepared by the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Committee of Senior Officials received with deep concern reports of recent developments in the crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Despite repeated efforts to arrange a lasting cease-fire and despite continued statements by all parties of their intention to seek a peaceful solution, the fighting has escalated. Recent heavy exchanges of fire have resulted in expansion of the crisis on the territory of Azerbaijan. Major cities have been subjected to bombardment and military occupation. Prospects for a negotiated settlement to the crisis have been damaged severely.

CSCE participating States remain determined to pursue all efforts to ensure progress towards such a peaceful settlement based on CSCE principles. They cannot accept the continuing destruction and the tragic loss of human life which results from continuation of the violence. They are concerned that, left unchecked, this conflict could tear the fabric of hard-won democratic development which has only recently begun in the countries of the area. If this were allowed to occur, our efforts to secure a stable and lasting peace throughout Europe would be endangered.

The new situation requires extraordinary steps. As stated in the decision of the Council of Ministers of 24 March 1992, CSCE participating States call on all parties to the conflict to renounce the use of force as a means of settling the dispute. Participating States condemn in particular expansion of the conflict into other areas of Azerbaijan, and reject implications that faits accomplis may be created by military means. They state in the strongest terms their demand for respect of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and call for immediate cessation of hostilities. There should be immediate withdrawal and disarming of all forces involved in the hostilities.

In the light of the urgent need for action to stop the fighting, the participating States have decided to call an emergency meeting of the States taking part in the conference on Nagorno-Karabakh agreed by the Council of Ministers on 24 March 1992. The meeting will be under the responsibility of Mr. Mario Raffaelli, who is chairman of the conference. Its goal should be to explore urgently all aspects of the situation, with a view to reopening the dialogue among parties to the conflict. The meeting should be scheduled as soon as possible. Mr. Raffaelli should present an assessment and recommendations for further actions to a meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials to be held in the first week of June.

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General Assembly Security Council

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S/24054
2 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Items 30, 35 and 74 of the
preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to bring the following to your immediate attention:

Israel, the occupying Power, has now kept the Gaza Strip sealed off for eight consecutive days. In practical terms, this means that the Strip is completely cut off from the outside world, following the blockage of all sea and land exits. In addition, the curfew is - for the ninth consecutive day - still in effect in the central area of the Strip.

Furthermore, the process of separating the different areas of the Strip from each other is being maintained, particularly by allowing armed settlers - whose presence in the occupied territory is illegal - to block the internal road from the northern to the southern areas by setting up controls on the road south of the town of Deir el Balah.

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* A/47/50.

These practices are among the most repulsive forms of collective punishment imaginable. Besides making the lives of some 850,000 Palestinian nationals living in the Gaza Strip unbearable, the practices also flagrantly violate the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and are incompatible with many resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as human rights conventions.

The Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations calls for urgent intervention by the Security Council and the Secretary-General to put an end to this tragic situation in the Gaza Strip. It also calls upon them to implement relevant Security Council resolutions, and in particular resolution 681 (1990). In addition, we repeat once more the demands of the Palestinian people to ensure the provision of international protection in the occupied territory as the only possible practical solution to end the suffering of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory and to halt Israeli practices against them there. Efforts in this direction will create the necessary conditions for the continuation and successful outcome of the current peace process.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 30, 35 and 74 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser AL-KIDWA
Permanent Observer of Palestine
to the United Nations

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/24055
3 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to bring to your attention the text, in French and English, of a statement on Security Council resolution 757 (1992), adopted by the European Community and its member States at Brussels and Lisbon on 1 June 1992.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Bernard P. H. P. MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) Thomas L. RICHARDSON
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on United Nations Security Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992

The European Community and its member States welcome United Nations Security Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992. They will, without delay, take the legal measures needed to ensure the immediate enforcement of the measures adopted on that resolution.

The European Community and its member States express the view that those measures should be considered in the light of their untiring efforts to achieve a lasting and peaceful solution for the problems of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, namely through the Conference on Yugoslavia and through the talks of the three communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina on constitutional arrangements. The adopted measures, therefore, should remain in force until decisive steps by those directly responsible have been taken in the direction of peace.

The European Community and its member States urge all parties to the Yugoslav crisis, and in particular Serbia and Montenegro, to comply with all relevant EC declarations and Security Council resolutions and recall the special obligation which falls upon them in the search for a peaceful and negotiated solution for those outstanding problems.

The European Community and its member States remain deeply concerned with the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While recalling their declaration of 11 May 1992, they urge again all parties involved in the conflict to engage constructively in the constitutional talks under the aegis of the EC Peace Conference as the only political framework which may enable a peaceful solution for the conflict in that Republic.

The European Community and its member States will continue to follow closely developments in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and will be ready to take further measures if and whenever deemed appropriate.

UNITED
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S/24056
3 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to refer to the letter dated 26 May 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, circulated as document S/24002 of 26 May 1992. In that letter, reference is made to letters dated 1 April and 21 May 1992 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission respectively to the Vice-Chairman of the Military Industrial Corporation of Iraq, General Amer Rashid, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf. These letters, together with a further letter dated 2 April 1992 from the Executive Chairman to General Amer Rashid, are transmitted herewith for the information of the members of the Security Council.

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Annex I

Letter dated 1 April 1992 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the Military Industrial Corporation of Iraq

During the meetings in New York on 12 and 13 March, you suggested that a team of experts from the Special Commission visit Baghdad early April. The aim of the visit would be for the team to review documents prepared by Iraq by that time containing the full, final and complete disclosure of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres as required by resolution 707 (1991) as well as the initial declarations required by the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991).

This visit would be appropriate if there were a clear acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Security Council resolutions 707 and 715 (1991) and under the plans approved by resolution 715 (1991). In the absence of such an acknowledgement, the credibility of any declarations would be put into question and this potentially valuable idea would fail to serve a useful purpose. If, however, the acknowledgements were given, the visit could become a part of the full implementation of the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, including those contained in the statements of the President of the Council on 19 and 28 February and 12 March.

If these political prerequisites are met, the Special Commission would need to receive ahead of the visit the final draft documents. The preliminary study of those by our experts in New York would make the subsequent discussions in Baghdad more productive.

In a separate letter I am conveying to you some observations resulting from the review of the preliminary drafts made available to the Special Commission by the Iraqi delegation during the meetings in New York on 12 and 13 March.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
Office of the Special Commission

Annex II

Letter dated 2 April 1992 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission addressed to the Vice-Chairman of the Military Industrial Corporation of Iraq

The experts of the Special Commission have reviewed the preliminary draft declarations that were made available to the Commission on an unofficial basis by the Iraqi technical team during the meetings in New York on 12 and 13 March.

It is the view of the Commission that these drafts need further work to ensure that the declarations to be submitted by Iraq correspond - both in substance and in format - to the requirements of the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1) approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991). During the meetings in March, the Special Commission's experts have already given, in response to the queries of the Iraqi team, explanations as regards the requirements to provide detailed information, as outlined in the plan, on imports including suppliers and other details and where required information on operational issues. The review of the drafts has prompted the following additional remarks.

I would like to reiterate the basic point of the whole concept behind the plan. The aim of the plan is to establish a mechanism through which the Special Commission would monitor and verify items, sites and facilities that are elements of activities non-prohibited under resolution 687 (1991) but which could also be used for prohibited activities related to chemical and biological weapons or ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. It is assumed that the issues concerning all items and facilities prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) would be resolved under that resolution. However, some items or facilities might still require long-term monitoring and verification under the plan. Nevertheless the prime focus of the plan is on items, facilities and sites that were or are engaged in non-prohibited activities but which - because of their nature and capabilities - could be diverted to activities proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). This principle of monitoring dual-purpose items and facilities to ensure that no proscribed activities take place is a well-established approach in a number of multilateral and bilateral arms control and disarmament treaties in force or under negotiation including on chemical and biological weapons.

The declarations to be provided by Iraq under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification should contain all required information on activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, that might be used for purposes prohibited under paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991). The substantive requirements for such declarations and their formats are defined in relevant sections and annexes of the plan.

Our review of the drafts received at the meetings in March showed that the drafts in their present form are not fully in line with the prime focus of the plan and lack important information required by the plan. We assume that they would be reworked pursuant to the discussions held in New York in March. Nevertheless, we would like to point to some aspects to assist you in the preparation of the complete declarations under the plan. Evidently these comments cannot cover all the requirements outlined in the plan as the Special Commission does not possess information on all relevant items, facilities and activities in Iraq; they are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

In the missile area, for example, information should be provided on all missiles, including on any project and any site specified in the plan for such missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. Although some of these missiles were mentioned in the list in annex A, appendix 1, of the draft on missiles the relevant facilities were not clearly identified and described; some missiles and the relevant sites and facilities have not been mentioned at all in the list, for example Saqr-200, Ababil-100, surface-to-air missiles. The information on shorter range missiles and relevant sites and facilities is necessary to verify that they are not modified to become prohibited types of missiles nor are used as sites and facilities for production/repair thereof. The same goes for information on any project or any site or facility for missile research, development, modification or testing so that the Special Commission may monitor that they are not diverted to proscribed purposes.

In the chemical area we note practically no information on sites and facilities associated with the prohibited activities involving the five declared chemicals, except phosgene, identified on list A of annex II of the plan. Other required information has been found lacking for example on imports, financing, production capacities etc. No mention is made of the planned activities that are referred to in paragraph 30 (d) of the plan. The information on quantities of material should be conducive, if necessary through additional explanations, to establishing "material balances" for declared activities.

In the biological area the material in the pertinent draft declaration although containing many relevant data is not organized in such a way as to answer directly the requests for information outlined in section D (paras. 35 and 36) and annex III of the plan.

Under the plan (paras. 20 and 21) Iraq is asked to adopt, and inform the Special Commission of, legislative and administrative measures taken to implement relevant Security Council resolutions and the plan. This information was not found in the drafts.

The review of the drafts reveals that the format of the presentation of the information in many cases does not follow the parameters established by the provisions of the plan. The format also differs from one section of the

drafts to another. The information should be presented in a form required by the plan in a clear and consistent manner to allow the Special Commission to establish a clear and unobscured picture of Iraq's relevant capabilities for monitoring and verification purposes and to prevent any misunderstandings from the very beginning of the practical implementation of the plan. For these reasons it is important that Iraq respond completely to every request for information contained in the plan and its annexes; in cases where there is no information to report under a specific request Iraq should provide nil returns. It would be helpful if cross-references would be made to appropriate paragraphs of the sections or the annexes of the plan under which the specific information is provided.

Finally, I need to stress once again the point that was made during our meetings in New York. Without the clear acknowledgement by the Government of Iraq of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), there would be no firm political basis for the proper implementation of Security Council resolution; the credibility of the declarations by Iraq would be greatly undermined. If this remains the situation, then the Special Commission would still not be in a position to report to the Security Council that the resolutions and decisions of the Council including those in the statement of the President of the Council made on the conclusion of the Council's meetings on 11 and 12 March are being complied with fully.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
Office of the Special Commission

Annex III

Letter dated 21 May 1992 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission addressed to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

The Special Commission (UNSCOM) will shortly have to prepare a report for the Security Council on the state of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Council resolutions in connection with the Council's 60-day review of the provisions of paragraph 20 of Council resolution 687 (1991). Unless there are positive developments on the initiative of Iraq in the near future, the Special Commission will have no alternative but to conclude that no progress has been made in obtaining from Iraq any of the following:

(a) The full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes;

(b) The acknowledgement of its obligations under Security Council resolution 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution 715 (1991) (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1);

(c) The provision of the declarations called for under the plans.

After the visit of the Deputy Prime Minister to New York in March 1992, it had been the Commission's understanding from its discussions with the representatives of Iraq that positive developments in these respects would be forthcoming by early April 1992. More than a month after that date, this has proved not to be the case. Thus, the Security Council's hope that the goodwill expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq would be matched by deeds has so far not been met in all the important respects listed above. The Commission will be obliged to report likewise on the issue of airport facilities for its fixed-wing aircraft, which was the subject of my letter to you of 10 April 1992. You will recall that I suggested, in order to avoid an early formal determination by the Commission that Rasheed airport is the most appropriate for its work, that the Government if Iraq should propose to the Commission an airport in Baghdad and agree to the modalities for its use. That report will also have to record that the situation at Habbaniyah airport has deteriorated as a result of the actions of the Iraqi authorities.

I have written this letter to you in an effort to seek from Iraq a practical manifestation of the cooperation which had been promised, but which has not been forthcoming, and so that you may be aware of what I will otherwise be obliged to report to the Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
Office of the Special Commission

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/24057
3 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The letter dated 29 May 1992 from the Israeli representative (document S/24032), in which he expressed a wish to point out so-called "salient facts" about the situation prevailing in southern Lebanon, demonstrated Israel's consistent policy of misleading public opinion with respect to the nature of the 14-year-long Israeli occupation of a large part of southern Lebanon, its justification of the killings and acts of destruction carried out by Israeli forces against Lebanese civilians and their property and its constant violation of Lebanese sovereignty in a manner incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international laws and conventions.

The letter implies that Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence and the defence of Israeli civilians: this could not be further from the truth.

It is the citizens of southern Lebanon who suffer every day from raids by the Israeli air force, from the intensive artillery bombardment of their villages and houses, from the demolitions of their homes and schools carried out by the Israeli forces and their associates and from the widespread expulsion of the population from areas adjacent to the territories occupied by Israel. All these measures are designed to protect and preserve the occupation.

The limited acts of resistance carried out by Lebanese nationals inside Lebanese territory simply represent the natural exercise of a legitimate right established in the Charter and international treaties and are directed only against the military presence of the Israeli occupation.

Israeli officials have the audacity to call upon the Lebanese Government to protect their occupation of Lebanese territory despite the fact that the Israeli Government has made no indication of its intention to terminate that occupation in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

In his letter, the Israeli representative accuses the Lebanese Government of not fulfilling its international obligations, although Lebanon has and continues to be a victim of Israeli aggression and repeated invasion of its territory. Lebanon is one of the founder Members of the United Nations and has always operated in conformity with its Charter. Israel, meanwhile, was accepted as a Member of the international Organization on the basis of conditions which it has failed to fulfil at any time in its history. As a State, it has been subject to constant condemnation in the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other organizations. Israel's current occupation of Lebanese territory is a flagrant example of its defiance of international will as expressed in resolution 425 (1978).

The letter also portrays Israel as being the party committed to the ongoing peace process. This claim has repeatedly been disproved in the light of Israel's acts of military escalation against Lebanon on the eve of each round of bilateral negotiations and of its constant policy of creating crises in order to prevent normalization of the situation in Lebanon. Its policy thus impedes the peace process in the Middle East as a whole.

The extraordinary and tragic situation of Lebanese living in the south of their country will inevitably be resolved if Israel implements Security Council resolution 425 (1978). This would allow the Lebanese Government to extend its sovereignty to all its territory and to impose the rule of law in such a way as to restore security and peace in the region after a long period of bloody and futile conflict.

The situation in southern Lebanon provides an opportunity to test the sincerity of professed intentions to ensure the success of the Middle East peace process, this being the least complicated aspect provided there is a genuine desire to build confidence between the parties. The first practical step would be for Israel to halt its bloody and destructive war against Lebanese nationals and to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978), now that the years have demonstrated the futility of its policy and the negative consequences for the future of the region and its population.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/24058
3 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 3 June 1992, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the Council in connection with the item entitled "Central America: Efforts towards peace":

"The members of the Security Council have taken note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

"They are pleased that the cease-fire is holding and there has not been a single violation since it came into force on 1 February 1992.

"However, the members of the Council are deeply concerned about the many delays by both parties in implementing agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN and the climate of mutual suspicion that still remains. If that situation were to continue, it would jeopardize the very foundation of the agreements.

"They urge both parties to demonstrate good faith in implementing the agreements fully, to abide by the agreed time-limits, to exert every effort to bring about national reconciliation in El Salvador and to implement the process of demobilization and reform.

"The members of the Council reaffirm their full support for the efforts made by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Iqbal Riza, with the assistance of the "Friends of the Secretary-General" and other Governments concerned. They commend the staff of ONUSAL, who are working under very difficult conditions, and express their concern about the threats to their safety. They remind the parties of their obligation to take all necessary measures to guarantee the safety of ONUSAL and its members.

"The members of the Council will continue to monitor closely developments in the implementation of the peace agreements in El Salvador."

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LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your report on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/24040) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council.

They welcome the fact that the two parties have agreed to engage in discussions with your Special Representative, Mr. Yaqub Khan, with a view to reactivating the settlement plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. They reaffirm their support for the efforts which you personally and your Special Representative are making in this connection.

The members of the Council share your views on the necessity of maintaining in place the MINURSO personnel currently deployed in Western Sahara in order to monitor the cease-fire.

In view of the increasing urgency of the situation, the members of the Council would be grateful if you would submit to them at the earliest possible date a further progress report on the implementation of the plan.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
President of the Security Council

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